anonymize Tub IDs when using Tahoe-LAFS with anonymity net like Tor or I2p #2384

New Issue

tahoe-lafs · 2015-02-10T18:23:24Z

dawuud commented

2015-02-10 18:23:24 +00:00

I believe it was Leif Ryge who first pointed this out...
We really need to randomize the client ID when using an anonymity network like Tor or I2p.

This ticket is definitely related to #517
https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/517

This ticket also seems to be a sub-ticket of #1010
https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1010
in so far as we can turn this client ID randomization on and off with a configuration option.

I believe it was Leif Ryge who first pointed this out... We really need to randomize the client ID when using an anonymity network like Tor or I2p. This ticket is definitely related to #517 <https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/517> This ticket also seems to be a sub-ticket of #1010 <https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1010> in so far as we can turn this client ID randomization on and off with a configuration option.

tahoe-lafs added the

labels 2015-02-10 18:23:24 +00:00

tahoe-lafs added this to the undecided milestone 2015-02-10 18:23:24 +00:00

zooko changed title from ~~anonymize client IDs when using Tahoe-LAFS with anonymity net like Tor or I2p~~ to anonymize Tub IDs when using Tahoe-LAFS with anonymity net like Tor or I2p

2015-02-10 18:26:35 +00:00

zooko commented

2015-02-10 18:56:28 +00:00

Brian pointed out in Nuts & Bolts today that #510 would solve this.

zooko commented

2015-02-10 18:57:43 +00:00

Replying to zooko:

Brian pointed out in Nuts & Bolts today that #510 would solve this.

Or maybe it was Daira who pointed that out.

Replying to [zooko](/tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25/issues/2384#issuecomment-96777): > Brian pointed out in Nuts & Bolts today that #510 would solve this. Or maybe it was Daira who pointed that out.

daira commented

2015-02-11 16:25:14 +00:00

Replying to [zooko]comment:3:

Replying to zooko:

Brian pointed out in Nuts & Bolts today that #510 would solve this.

Or maybe it was Daira who pointed that out.

It was. (More precisely, that an HTTP-based protocol wouldn't have this specific problem with client tub IDs, although that isn't the only problem involved in client anonymisation.)

Replying to [zooko]comment:3: > Replying to [zooko](/tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25/issues/2384#issuecomment-96777): > > Brian pointed out in Nuts & Bolts today that #510 would solve this. > > Or maybe it was Daira who pointed that out. It was. (More precisely, that an HTTP-based protocol wouldn't have this specific problem with client tub IDs, although that isn't the only problem involved in client anonymisation.)

warner commented

2016-08-29 23:30:17 +00:00

Current status: client connections to storage servers use ephemeral Tubs (thanks to #2759), so storage servers won't see tub-id correlations between subsequent boots of a single client.

The IntroducerClient, though, uses a static tub (with key stored in NODEDIR/private/node.pem) for all connections. So the Introducer can correlate connections across client reboots.

Do folks think we can close this ticket as is, or should we use an ephemeral Tub for the introducer client too?

(note that when Accounting happens, clients will get a persistent !Ed25519 public key, and they'll sign their storage-server messages with it. But I think we can just declare that when anonymous=true, these keys are disabled, or regenerated at each boot, and you don't get to participate in any accounting-related tasks. Maybe we can add a pseudonymous=true flag which will allow persistent client pubkeys, but still enforce the other safety restrictions. In that world, servers could tell which clients were which, but that "identity" is still unlinked to the client's real IP address)

Current status: client connections to storage servers use ephemeral Tubs (thanks to #2759), so storage servers won't see tub-id correlations between subsequent boots of a single client. The IntroducerClient, though, uses a static tub (with key stored in `NODEDIR/private/node.pem`) for all connections. So the Introducer can correlate connections across client reboots. Do folks think we can close this ticket as is, or should we use an ephemeral Tub for the introducer client too? (note that when Accounting happens, clients will get a persistent !Ed25519 public key, and they'll sign their storage-server messages with it. But I think we can just declare that when `anonymous=true`, these keys are disabled, or regenerated at each boot, and you don't get to participate in any accounting-related tasks. Maybe we can add a `pseudonymous=true` flag which will allow persistent client pubkeys, but still enforce the other safety restrictions. In that world, servers could tell which clients were which, but that "identity" is still unlinked to the client's real IP address)

warner added

code-network

and removed

unknown

labels 2016-08-29 23:30:47 +00:00

warner modified the milestone from undecided to 1.12.0

2016-08-29 23:30:47 +00:00

warner commented

2016-09-06 19:27:58 +00:00

In today's devchat, we decided to document the TubID linkages that clients currently reveal (introducer client + storage server, and multiple connections within a single client lifetime for everything else), and then close this ticket. We'll add a new ticket (with milestone=undecided) for either addressing the remaining linkages, or WONTFIXing them.

In today's devchat, we decided to document the TubID linkages that clients currently reveal (introducer client + storage server, and multiple connections within a single client lifetime for everything else), and then close this ticket. We'll add a new ticket (with milestone=`undecided`) for either addressing the remaining linkages, or WONTFIXing them.

warner self-assigned this 2016-09-06 19:29:16 +00:00

warner commented

2016-09-13 09:22:47 +00:00

#2828 added for addressing/accepting the remaining linkages.

Brian Warner <warner@lothar.com> commented

2016-09-13 09:23:12 +00:00

In 80acd56/trunk:

docs: describe known linkability

closes ticket:2384

In [80acd56/trunk](/tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25/commit/80acd565e2f49717450a3281139fe80f9c855f7e): ``` docs: describe known linkability closes ticket:2384 ```

tahoe-lafs added the

fixed

label 2016-09-13 09:23:12 +00:00

Brian Warner <warner@lothar.com> closed this issue

2016-09-13 09:23:12 +00:00

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