Non-Repudiation Not covered in Integrity #1874

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opened 2012-11-22 07:00:39 +00:00 by calltodsi · 6 comments
calltodsi commented 2012-11-22 07:00:39 +00:00
Owner

I have been testing the LAFS-Tahoe V1.9.2 package. It is observed that during the user/storage-server uploading and downloading(files) processes there is a lack that one critical link missing that is required to track data stored in cloud storage.

Though communication is happening over SSL, a user/server may refuse the sender's/receiver's certificate. So any one of them could be malicious.

Atleast there should be a signed message digest.

So, while uploading a document how a user can trust the Storage Server.

I have been testing the LAFS-Tahoe V1.9.2 package. It is observed that during the user/storage-server uploading and downloading(files) processes there is a lack that one critical link missing that is required to track data stored in cloud storage. Though communication is happening over SSL, a user/server may refuse the sender's/receiver's certificate. So any one of them could be malicious. Atleast there should be a signed message digest. So, while uploading a document how a user can trust the Storage Server.
tahoe-lafs added the
code-mutable
supercritical
defect
1.9.2
labels 2012-11-22 07:00:39 +00:00
tahoe-lafs added this to the 1.11.0 milestone 2012-11-22 07:00:39 +00:00
davidsarah commented 2012-11-22 07:25:02 +00:00
Author
Owner

Duplicate of #1422.

Note that "supercritical" priority is only for things that require an immediate point release.

Duplicate of #1422. Note that "supercritical" priority is only for things that require an immediate point release.
tahoe-lafs added
major
and removed
supercritical
labels 2012-11-22 07:25:02 +00:00
tahoe-lafs added
code-frontend-cli
duplicate
and removed
code-mutable
labels 2012-11-22 07:28:06 +00:00
tahoe-lafs modified the milestone from 1.11.0 to eventually 2012-11-22 07:28:06 +00:00
davidsarah commented 2012-11-22 07:30:50 +00:00
Author
Owner

By the way, the relevant security property here isn't nonrepudiability. That would be the inability for the server to deny that it had performed some operation. SSL/TLS does not provide nonrepudiability.

By the way, the relevant security property here isn't nonrepudiability. That would be the inability for the server to deny that it had performed some operation. SSL/TLS does not provide nonrepudiability.
calltodsi commented 2012-11-22 07:46:32 +00:00
Author
Owner

Do You mean that non-repudiability is not the security properties of LAFS? And is it not covered in LAFS?

Do You mean that non-repudiability is not the security properties of LAFS? And is it not covered in LAFS?
davidsarah commented 2012-11-22 22:47:46 +00:00
Author
Owner

Replying to calltodsi:

Do You mean that non-repudiability is not the security properties of LAFS? And is it not covered in LAFS?

That's right. Are you sure you're not confusing it with another property? Nonrepudiability is normally relevant only for things like contract signing, where a party wants to make a binding commitment that can be verified by anyone who has their public key. I don't think I've seen any storage system that provides it -- although of course you can store signed documents in Tahoe-LAFS.

Replying to [calltodsi](/tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25/issues/1874#issuecomment-90445): > Do You mean that non-repudiability is not the security properties of LAFS? And is it not covered in LAFS? That's right. Are you sure you're not confusing it with another property? Nonrepudiability is normally relevant only for things like contract signing, where a party wants to make a binding commitment that can be verified by anyone who has their public key. I don't think I've seen any storage system that provides it -- although of course you can store signed documents in Tahoe-LAFS.
davidsarah commented 2012-11-22 22:51:28 +00:00
Author
Owner

Ah, do you mean how can a client know which servers are in a grid?

Ah, do you mean how can a client know which servers are in a grid?
tahoe-lafs removed the
duplicate
label 2012-11-22 22:51:48 +00:00

I'm not sure what this ticket is about. How about if I close it and then calltodsi can re-open it and say what the is the security property that he wants to ensure, such as "I want to ensure that a client can tell which servers are on the grid." or "I want to ensure that a client only connects to certain servers." or something.

I'm not sure what this ticket is about. How about if I close it and then calltodsi can re-open it and say what the is the security property that he wants to ensure, such as "I want to ensure that a client can tell which servers are on the grid." or "I want to ensure that a client only connects to certain servers." or something.
zooko added the
invalid
label 2013-01-04 21:34:29 +00:00
zooko closed this issue 2013-01-04 21:34:29 +00:00
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Reference: tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25#1874
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