deterministic IV for writecaps for dir entries #750
Labels
No Label
0.2.0
0.3.0
0.4.0
0.5.0
0.5.1
0.6.0
0.6.1
0.7.0
0.8.0
0.9.0
1.0.0
1.1.0
1.10.0
1.10.1
1.10.2
1.10a2
1.11.0
1.12.0
1.12.1
1.13.0
1.14.0
1.15.0
1.15.1
1.2.0
1.3.0
1.4.1
1.5.0
1.6.0
1.6.1
1.7.0
1.7.1
1.7β
1.8.0
1.8.1
1.8.2
1.8.3
1.8β
1.9.0
1.9.0-s3branch
1.9.0a1
1.9.0a2
1.9.0b1
1.9.1
1.9.2
1.9.2a1
LeastAuthority.com automation
blocker
cannot reproduce
cloud-branch
code
code-dirnodes
code-encoding
code-frontend
code-frontend-cli
code-frontend-ftp-sftp
code-frontend-magic-folder
code-frontend-web
code-mutable
code-network
code-nodeadmin
code-peerselection
code-storage
contrib
critical
defect
dev-infrastructure
documentation
duplicate
enhancement
fixed
invalid
major
minor
n/a
normal
operational
packaging
somebody else's problem
supercritical
task
trivial
unknown
was already fixed
website
wontfix
worksforme
No Milestone
No Assignees
2 Participants
Notifications
Due Date
No due date set.
Reference: tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25#750
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
No description provided.
Delete Branch "%!s(<nil>)"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Okay, here is a patch which replaces
os.urandom(16)
with a (tagged) secure hash of the write cap. This protects the directory entries against the "VM rollback problem", which otherwise might expose the writecaps of entries to someone who has only the readcap to the dir in the case that the writer of the dir suffered a vm rollback.In addition, this makes packing deterministic, so that pack(unpack(packeddir)) == packeddir. (Kevan's original unit tests for this ticket assumed that would be the case.)
Is there any cryptographic problem that making this change would raise? It means that encryption of the writecaps doesn't have "semantic security" (which I think corresponds to IND-CPA?), but they actually didn't anyway since each one is accompanied by its readcap.
Perhaps surprisingly, this patch appears to reduce the CPU usage a little bit for packing directories (at least on Mac OS X).
Please examine this patch, all cryptographers and security experts!
Before this patch:
after this patch:
Attachment deterministic_IV.darcspatch.txt (22828 bytes) added
Okay, I went ahead and committed this in changeset:786ed012b3510135. Brian: I hope you sneak away from your vacation and log into the internet on your cell phone and review this patch before I release v1.5...
I think this is ok.. we're always using the same data with the same key, so no worries there.. we'd be enabling readers to mount a dictionary attack if we weren't already doing so by putting the readcap in the dirnode contents, so there's no increase in exposure there either.
I think it would be more accurate to call this a "salt" instead of an "IV" though, since 1) we're using CTR mode, and 2) we're hashing this value to generate and AES key, not an IV. I don't know what I was thinking when I named that value "IV" in the original code.
Also, looking at the code, we're using two hashes and not using the intermediate value anywhere. So how about using just one hash? Instead of:
we could use something like:
where
mutable_rwcap_key_hash2
is a one-argument function that hashes a fixed prefix with the writekey.I too am surprised by the apparent speedup. Maybe the kernel context-switching time needed to read from /dev/urandom (or the refill-/dev/urandom code that gets invoked when you drain few kb from the entropy pool) is larger than the SHA256 code that gets invoked by the extra hash. In any case, using just one hash ought to be faster than either the original code or the attached patch.
Whoops, I had forgotten that the name "IV" was wrong, and was misled by it into thinking it ought to be separate from the key. Your suggested patch sounds better to me.
oh, I'm being stupid and the new code is bad. What we're doing is encrypting a list of child writecaps in such a way that the containing dirnode's writecap is required to retrieve them. Obviously each child writecap must be encrypted with a different key. It is reasonable to use the hash of the child writecap as a salt (since there's no requirement that the constant child writecap be encrypted differently each time), but it is not ok to use the hash of the parent dirnode writecap as a salt (because that's the same for all children).
My suggested change is wrong too.
The code needs to be more like:
I'll make this change soon.
Whoops. Ouch. I'm sure glad you caught that! I was thinking when I wrote the patch that I was using the writecap of the entry as the input, but obviously I was using the key of the directory!
By the way, a more traditional way to do something like this would be to use the same key (the one for the dir) to encrypt each entry and use a unique IV for each entry. We are in the habit of instead generating a unique key for each thing we want to encrypt and typically just leaving the IV at 0, which seems fine to me, too.
Your proposed fix is in the latter tradition. Please hurry up and commit it so that nobody uses trunk to write directories insecurely!
Huh, I wasn't even aware of pycryptopp offering IV!=0.
I'll test the patch tomorrow, but I'm not sure I'll be able to to commit it until about 24h from now.
pushed, in changeset:c1d5717cf0ecd68f.